perception vectors. But which traits? Probably the closest approximation to the present sense of the term can be found in the work of the personality trait psychologists. As an approach to understanding the human personality, trait psychology has managed to produce only meager results, and has been virtually abandoned by modern researchers. Still, among the trait psychologists are found some distinguished names: Gordon and Floyd Allport, Hans Eysenck, David McClelland and Raymond B. Cattell. And the idea of trait psychology is still very alive in the personnel offices of American industry. As disappointing as the approach has been, it has held the attention of distinguished minds and has become one of the most widely used techniques in job recruitment. The basic problem with the trait approach is in the identification of the traits: most trait systems have been directed toward specialized tasks and few can be generalized to the broad, universal frame of reference of interest to us here. The California Personality Inventory, for example, couches trait definitions almost exclusively in normative terms, and in a real sense, there are "right" and "wrong" answers to the items which tap the traits. In fact, the normative character of most questions is so obvious that any perceptive individual interested in conforming to norms, or of giving the appearance that he is a conformer, and therefore, a good risk for employment, can manipulate the instrument, and present whatever picture he wants the persons interpreting the results to see. Because people always try to conform to norms of some kind, the probability of manipulating the CPI is dangerously high. In fact, it would probably be a fairly accurate measure of manipulation if viewed in this way. The Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory (MMPI), on the other hand, is geared exclusively to clinical problems, notably the discovery of syndromes of mental disorder. Only Cattell's 16 Factor Inventory is suitable for our purposes, and its only value lies in the manner in which it was constructed: Cattell employed factor analysis in which some eighty traits were reduced statistically to clusters of sixteen independent, or central source traits.[17] Through a highly subjective interpretation of each factor, I have arranged thirteen according to the classification of skill traits just advanced:

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[17] Raymond B. Cattell, *Personality and Motivation Structure and Measurement* (Yonkers-on-the-Hudson: World Book Company, 1957).

Figure 3.6

Selector	Renderer	Withdrawer	Submissive

Interaction Traits

Cyclothymia (easygoing, adaptable, warmhearted, frank, placid, emotionally expressive, trustful, credulous)	Schizothymia (obstructive, cantankerous, inflexible, rigid, cool, indifferent, secretive, anxious, reserved)
Dominance (self-assertive, confident, conceited, boastful, aggressive, pugnacious, extrapunitive, vigorous, forceful, willful)	Submissiveness (submissive, unsure, modest, retiring, complaisant, impunitive, meek, quiet, obedient, timid)
Surgency (cheerful, joyous, sociable, responsive, energetic, humorous, witty, talkative, placid, resourceful)	Desurgency (depressed, pessimistic, seclusive, retiring, subdued, languid, dull, phlegmatic, taciturn, introspective)
Parmia (adventurous, likes meeting people, strong interest in opposite sex, gregarious, genial, responsive, kindly, friendly, frank, impulsive)	Threctia (shy, timid, withdrawn, little interest in opposite sex, aloof, cold, self-contained, hard, hostile, secretive)
Excitability (demanding, impatient, attention-getting, exhibitionistic, excitable, overactive, prone to jealousy, self-assertive, egotistical, nervous)	Unexcitable (emotionally mature, self-sufficient, deliberate, not easily jealous, self-effacing, absence of nervousness, self-controlled, and conscientious)

Figure 3.6 (Continued)

Selector	Submissive	Renderer	Withdrawer
	Perceptual Traits		
Harria (emotionally mature, independent-minded, hard, lacking artistic feeling, unaffected by fancies, practical, logical, self-sufficient, responsible, free of hypochondria)		**Presmia** (demanding, impatient, dependent, immature, kindly, gentle, introspective, imaginative, intuitive, sensitive)	
Zeppia (goes with group, cooperates, decisive in thinking, active, assertive, vigorous, evaluates by common standards)		**Coasthenia** (acts individualistically, passively, pedantically obstructs, slow to make up mind, inactive, meek, quiet, neurotically fatigued)	
Comention (intellectual interests, analytical, polished, poised, composed, unshakable, independent-minded, idealistic, introspective)		**Abcultion** (unreflective, narrow, awkward, socially clumsy, easily embarrasses socially, lacking sense of social duty, crude, lacking aesthetic interests)	
Inner Relaxation (trustful, understanding, composed, socially at home)		**Protension** (suspicious, jealous, self-sufficient, withdrawn)	
Praxernia (conventional, uninterested in art, practical, logical, conscientious, worrying, anxious, alert, poised, tough control, narrow interests)		**Autia** (unconventional, eccentric, esthetically fastidious, sensitively imaginative, autonomous, undependable, placid, complacent, absorbed)	
Shrewdness (polished, socially skillful, exact mind, cool, aloof, insightful regarding self and others)		**Naivete** (socially clumsy, awkward, vague and sentimental mind, lacking independence of taste, lacking self insight, naive)	

Figure 3.6 (Continued)

Radicalism (serious, independent, sceptical, critical, takes intense actions on beliefs)	Conservatism (temperamental, tolerant, patient with trivia and tribulation, at ease, unresourceful)
Self Sentiment Control (stable interests, unshakable, cooperative, persistent, makes investments, accepts criticism, avoids thinking about the past)	Lack of Self Sentiment Control (contrary)

Note the change in categories from interaction to perceptual traits. Also, with respect to source trait definitions, the descriptive terms chosen represent only a sample of those provided by Cattell. They were selected because they seemed to represent (implicitly or explicitly) either interaction or perceptual approach or avoidance factors. For a more exact set of definitions, as well as estimates of reliability, validity, and interpretive hypotheses, see Cattell, part II.

A note of extreme caution must be injected here to guard against hasty generalizations about the probable number of traits or the composition of trait syndromes to be found empirically within any of the logical types. There is no reason to suppose that a fourfold logical classification even comes close to approximating the variety of syndromes that exist empirically. In fact, it is probably the case that the number of different syndromes is very large, which, if true, would render the logical classification meaningless. Thus, it may be analytically desirable to divide each of the four types into subtypes on the basis of additional criteria--perhaps the cognitive and ego dimensions of the personality. Were this to be done, we would undoubtedly discover that the analytical system would be a better approximation of reality. The other important problem in this vital area of theory and methodology has to do with the adequacy of existing inventories, including Cattell's, to provide theoretically and empirically accurate representations of traits. I have attempted to bend Cattell's traits to fit my own functional notion of the role of traits in human activity. However, it may be more satisfactory to begin from "scratch" with a complete reconstruction of trait psychology on the basis of field observation. This task, unhappily, is years beyond the scope of this work.

Ego Structure and Function

In the course of my short exposition of personality structure in Chapter II, I indicated that the major function of the ego was to coordinate the components of the personality into an efficient, highly integrated mechanism of acquisition. The ego is basically an evaluative and managerial agent that intelligently tests reality and selects that line of coordinated activity calculated to maximize profit, and forces the organism to perform the necessary operations to see it through. If the organism's success depends partly upon how well integrated the organism is, then inferentially success depends partly upon the ego. In a recent synthesis of the leading constructs of clinical psychology, John Bucklew employs the concept "ego strength" as one of the central components of psychopathology. A strong ego is found typically in the well-adjusted, adequate personality and a weak ego is associated with inadequacy, neurosis and psychosis.[18] Thus, efficient, integrated and coordinated activity seems positively related to the ability of people to adapt the environment or adjust to it with minimal error. A common characteristic of all persons classified clinically as "abnormal" is an inability to make satisfactory adaptations or adjustments, in either the subjective or normative sense. Most persons in this category have one thing in common: they commit serious and repetitive errors in behavior, which, at some point, becomes the social and legal basis for incarcerating them for treatment. In the pathologically ill, ego strength is probably fixed at a low level. But normal persons occasionally slump into periods of errant behavior. The implication is obvious: if errant behavior in the pathologically ill is a function of a permanently low quantum of ego strength, the occasional error in the behavior of "normal" people may be a function of an unstable, fluctuating quantum of ego strength. Thus, the strength of the ego, and the integration of the personality, may depend upon the stimulus patterns emitted by other personalities.

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[18] John Bucklew, Paradigms of Psychopathology (Chicago: J. P. Lippincott, 1960), p. 109.

Let us define

ego df that unit of the personality which links the individual components of the personality, and produces coordinated, efficient, functionally integrated behavior. The ego has four parameters: (a) intraception, or self-scrutiny, the purpose of which is to provide an accurate estimate of self by assessing needs, motives, capacities, abilities and energies precurrent to the use of self as a resource, (b) reality testing, or the gathering of accurate information for the purpose of testing models of empirical reality, (c) self-management, or the actual use of self as a productive resource in value acquisition, and (d) environmental management, or the control of other personalities and elements of the environment successfully. The presence of absence of these parameters, or the skill with which the activities of each is performed, determines ego strength: the more they are present and the better they are performed, the higher the ego strength.

The two reality testing functions, that is self-reality (intraception) and other-reality (reality testing), are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the two control functions (self-control and other-control). The two control functions are, in turn, two of the most significant determinants of success in acquiring values. The self cannot be used effectively as a resource until the organism knows precisely what kind of a resource it is; similarly, other personalities cannot be managed without some understanding of how and to what ends they can be used.

How exactly do the parameters of the ego converge to produce strength or weakness? The answer to this question rests on the answers to two corollaries: (a) how does the organism know when it has been successful? and (b) how can this success be translated into reinforcement of the successful activity? If the ego is an executive charged with integrating the personality and selecting efficient activity, then ego strength must have something to do with how well it performs its functions. In effect, the success of the organism must be fed back to reinforce the parameters of the ego. But how? First, the organism knows when it has been successful, in the subjective sense, by comparing its ideal with its real self-percept. Every person has an idea about what he wants to be ideally, and much of his activity is chosen with this ideal in mind. In order to know when the ideal has been achieved, an empirical test must be constructed to discover how close the real performance of the organism approximates the requirements of the ideal. This function is performed by the real self-percept. The quantum which results from such comparison is self-esteem.[19] The level of self-esteem, in turn, tells the organism how successful its management has been. Thus, external, or value acquisition success, can be linked directly to internal, managerial success. One requires the other, and reinforcement of the internal management functions of the ego depends upon being able to link the quality of the management to the quality of performance. Thus, the greater the success in the performance of activity, the smaller the distance between the ideal and real self-percepts; the smaller the distance between the self-percepts, the greater the self-esteem; and the greater the self-esteem, the stronger the ego as a result of reinforcement of management functions. Reinforcement of the management or control functions, of course, produces concomitant reinforcement of the vital cognitive functions (intraception and reality testing).

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[19] Arthur S. Cohen, "Some Implications of Self-Esteem for Social Influence," Janis and Hovland, p. 103.

When successful performance increases efficient value acquisition, self-esteem increases and ego strength goes up as a result of reinforcement. Increased ego strength, in turn, raises the probability of successful performance in the future. However, the behavior of some persons frequently points to permanent impairment of the ego, or the domain over which the ego can perform well. Some people are always unsuccessful, or inadequate, no matter how many opportunities for success are presented them. A typical example is the member of the Bowery community who occasionally leaves the Bowery, only to fail "on the outside" and return. This phenomenon may be explained by adding an all-or-none dimension to self-esteem. Minimal ego strength can be conceptualized as requiring a particular quantum of self-esteem, let us say, 50 percent of total capacity (whatever that happens to be). The level of self-esteem results from the support or lack of it within the earliest socialization settings. If the environment is aversive, most operants will elicit negative values, or punishments, and failures will begin to outweigh successes from the beginning. The distance between the two percepts will be broad, and self-esteem will never rise to the critical level required for minimal ego strength. Sooner or later, the organism will adjust to the perceptual gulf between the ideal and real self-percepts by pushing the ideal toward the real (assuming they have not become permanently fixed through neurosis). In effect, the organism comes to the conclusion that his failure to achieve any semblance of the ideal is a result of his own inherent or natural inferiority. From that point on, success becomes meaningless; ego strength is unimportant, and the integration of the personality never occurs. This, of course, will severely limit the capacity of the organism to deal with its environment. On the other hand, if the environment is munificent, most operants will be rewarded and successes will far outweigh failures. The distance between the ideal and real self-percepts will be narrow, self-esteem high; the ego will possess that vital minimal quantum of strength, in addition to the strength produced by continuing success. The real self-percept will constantly be pulled toward the ideal, and the organism will be able to deal with a progressively more difficult environment. Lack of success will be attributed to both the self and the condition of the environment. Schematically, the relationship can be represented as follows:

Figure 3.7

Environment	Self-Esteem	
	High	Low
	Ego Strength	
	High Minimal	None
Aversive		Ideal → Real
Munificent	Ideal ← Real	

Definition of success and failure in value acquisition is seldom under the exclusive control of the acquiring organism. It is, after all, a matter of cognitive definition, and cognitive definition depends partly upon social consensus or some other technique of authoritative warranty. Thus, private definition of success is often under influence by other people. The only way I really know that I have been successful in writing an important book is when an "authority" applauds. If my own definition of success is dependent upon social definitions, then the level of my self-esteem is partly in the hands of persons with whom I interact. By inference, they also have access to my ego strength. This access, as we will see in the next chapter, is a fundamental condition for exacting certain kinds of compliance, and the level of compliance in social activity is one of the determinants of social success.

Development and Socialization

Human development is a function of the interaction of a biologically and intellectually ready organism and a supportive, rewarding environment. Erik Erikson formulates the relationship in a way that captures the full extent of the available potentialities:

> the human personality in principle develops according to steps predetermined in the growing person's readiness to be driven toward, to be aware of, and to interact with a widening social radius; and . . . society, in principle, tends to be so constituted as to meet and invite this succession of potentialities for interaction and attempts to safeguard and to encourage the proper rate and the proper sequence of their enfolding.[20]

On the organismic side of the formula, the major factor determining readiness is the level of intelligence: intelligence determines discrimination, and the level of discrimination determines the capacity to learn. I have already noted Jean Piaget's work in the field of intelligence development, and I will adopt his notion that intelligence is sequential and evolutionary, made up of four successive stages: sensory-motor, preoperational, concretely operational and formally operational. These four categories will provide the cast into which the basic developmental process will be poured; intelligence has been selected because of its obviously preeminent place in human development. The second important factor is environmental, and involves a series of psychosocial crises out of which the total personality emerges. Erik Erikson, who has rightful claim to this approach, believes that the interaction of natural sexual development and the normative requirements of society combine to create critical conflicts out of which comes a series of "gains" which are eventually synthesized into an ego identity during adolescence. Erikson's definition of ego identity coincides with our definition of an integrated personality containing four components and a relatively permanent content. Implied in Erikson's model is the assumption that every society opts for a modal personality which will best fit the general requirements of that society. Thus, each crisis has an ideal, or preferred outcome which is positively sanctioned by society. We will try to avoid the overtly Freudian elements of Erikson's model because they are unnecessary to the general validity of his observations and interpretations. In effect, the eight psychosocial crises have far more than sexual significance. As we will see, they are also convenient techniques for making the shaping of needs and skill traits more meaningful in a developmental sense.

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[20] Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1963), p. 270.

General Stage I

The first stage encompasses the period between birth and approximately two years of age. This stage is characterized by sensory-motor intelligence,[21] in which the primitive or raw data of the senses are aggregated and integrated into simple images of objects. Near the end of this period, images are assigned the simple symbols allocated by socialization agents. The infant also learns that objects (a) conserve their properties, even though they undergo illusory change with change in position and lighting, (b) retain their properties through space and time, (c) and are part of an external world. The infant also begins to evolve a primitive classificatory system out of which his epistemology will eventually emerge, and a limited, physical notion of causality. The accumulation of images that represent reality gradually provide a basis for operant activity. In effect, the infant begins to select activity on the basis of preferred images. At this point, intelligence and cognitive structure are intertwined, and inseparable. The first epigenetic conflict is between trust and mistrust, with trust the socially preferred outcome. Trust implies a pervasive faith in other people, and a generally optimistic cognitive orientation.[22] Resolution in favor of trust implants a need to affiliate, nurture and perhaps imitate (similance): these needs are met by being Cyclothymic and Surgent. However, should resolution favor mistrust, the organism should acquire reverse needs: the need to reject and to be succored. Such needs can be met by the organism becoming Excitable, Schizothymic, Desurgent and Protensive. Any of these traits may be sufficient to meet any of the needs. Thus, it is unnecessary for the organism to acquire all of them--one may be enough given a particular setting. The number of needs acquired during this period is appropriately small because the organism is preoccupied with learning to eat, to control its motor functions, to eliminate, to explore, and to test, mature and integrate its sensory apparatus. In effect, existing biogenic needs (and neurogenic needs) limit the probability of a massive pyramiding of emotional needs. Affiliation, rejection, nurturance and succorance are the only really meaningful needs for which the organism is fully prepared during this stage.

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[21] Inhelder and Piaget; also, Jean Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence in Children (New York: International University Press, 1954; The Construction of Reality in the Child (New York: Basic Books, 1954); Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood (New York: W. W. Norton, 1951).

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[22] Erikson, pp. 247-251.

General Stage II

The second stage of development covers a much larger, and in most respects a much more significant period of time: two (or three) to around six (or seven, possibly even eight). It is a period when most needs are learned, when the most significant cognitive elements solidify into a structure, the infant or child encounters morality for the first time, the two most significant control elements of the ego emerge, and two vital epigenetic crises are resolved. It is a period pregnant with possibilities, but fraught with pitfalls which may have a lasting impression on the child's personality. The period of preoperational intelligence begins with the construction of simple, static models of reality out of the images and symbols formed during the sensory-motor stage. In general, the models lack conceptual elegance and classificatory refinement. Categories tend to be based upon straightforward perceptual relationships, rather than upon creative analysis. Discrimination is obviously limited. The models lack the dynamic, multidimensional properties implicit in more sophisticated versions of reality. The child's conceptual system is totally egocentric, and, of course, totally encapsulated. There is not the slightest thought that things could be different from the way the child sees them. Moreover, the child assumes that his models are representative of a universal, generalized reality; he totally ignores the possibility that reality could be seen differently from another frame of reference. The child also believes that his models are shared by other people. In the eyes of the preoperational child, objects take on animistic qualities, and the child believes that objects originate by creation (probably the reason children are so vulnerable to religious accounts of the creation). Most important of all, the models lack operational properties: they cannot be expanded, tested or refined in the absence of the logical, mathematical, and statistical tools. Even if the child had the tools, the inherent egocentrism of this period would render them useless.

The egocentric quality of preoperational intelligence is the result of the next epigenetic crisis: autonomy versus shame and doubt. It is here that the child begins to differentiate himself from the external world: separation is critical to control. When resolution is autonomy (the socially preferred result), autonomy, dominance, similance and curiosity needs may be internalized. These needs can be met by the child becoming Dominant, Confident, Parmiac. However, if resolution is in favor of shame and doubt, quite another outcome emerges. According to Erikson, "From a sense of self-control without loss of self-esteem comes a lasting sense of good will and pride; from a sense of loss of self-control and of foreign overcontrol comes a lasting propensity for doubt and shame."[23] Shame and doubt mean abasement, deference, infravoidance and inviolacy needs, gratified by the organism becoming Guilt Prone, Emotional, Submissive, Threctiac. Resolution in favor of autonomy also establishes one of the central parameters of the ego: self-control.

Piaget, in his classic The Moral Judgment of the Child, divides the moral development of the child into two periods: the heteronomous, which occurs between the ages of four and eight, and the autonomous, which develops after eight. The heteronomous period is characterized by an almost slavish acceptance of the rules laid down by adult authority, belief in severe and uncompromising punishment, and a conception of wrong concerned only with "stepping over the line," regardless of intention. The onset of this period is dramatic when placed against the background of total rejection of adult rules which characterizes the period between two and four. Around the time of the autonomy/shame and doubt epigenetic crisis, the child quite naturally rejects the rules imposed by others; during this conflict, the successful rejection of such foreign control is critical to the socially preferred resolution (autonomy) and the internalization of the vital self-control parameter of the ego. How are we to account for this vivid reversal, and why does it take on absolutist properties? The answer to the second question is more obvious than the first: the basic element determining the content and composition of the rules accepted is the intellectual backwardness of preoperational intelligence. The models of the preoperational stage are static, single dimensional, simplistic, egocentric, generalized, absolute, universal, and incapable of adequate testing. It is not surprising that the cognitive structure of morality (primitive beliefs) evolves similar properties.

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[23] Ibid., p. 254.

The dramatic reversal is a result of the third epigenetic crisis: initiative versus guilt. It is a period in which the child begins intensive operations on the environment. As Erikson puts it,

> Initiative adds to autonomy the quality of undertaking, planning and "attacking" a task for the sake of being active and on the move, where before self-will, more often than not, inspired acts of defiance or, at any rate, protested independence.[24]

It is a period characterized by an intense need to know as a condition to action. From the ages of five to seven, the child is presented with an expanding array of challenges and conflicts, beginning with playmates outside the regulated confines of the household to the often painful demands for achievement in school. For the first time in its life, the child begins to be rated and graded in reference to other children--performance becomes a critical problem. At the same time, the child becomes painfully aware of the differences in settings, and the requirements for different types of "appropriate" behavior (peer as opposed to school). The child is faced simultaneously with two contradictory needs: the need for stability that grows out of its quantum involvement with reality and the need to know to meet the situational demands of this widening universe of interaction. He needs the stability of authoritative, absolute rules of confact, but few of the rules apply in all situations. The child is under considerable strain to break away from the authoritarian rules of the past and begin to evolve more satisfactory models of behavior. Thus, at the beginning of the heteronomous stage, there is an intense need for authoritative models which can be employed to realize the potential implicit in the initiative/guilt crisis. The child's incapacity to build his own models operationally makes him accept those supplied by parental authority. At the end of the heteronomous stage, the new demands of a widening universe of interaction produce a strain that requires expansion of the existing models. The child's incapacity to test reality in the operational sense, and the fact that the models have been learned under conditions of limited discrimination requires that the child leave the existing models behind in favor of new ones. But the old models are not lost--quite conveniently, they begin to play a new and important role: the residual interpretation of reality, which satisfies the need for stability in a period of intense instability and environmental indeterminancy and change. They also satisfy society's demand for internalization of normative standards. In effect, the first models of empirical reality of the cognitive system eventually become the child's primitive beliefs.

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[24] _Ibid_., p. 255.

once the emotional charges are added, these beliefs become important sources of operant activity.

In a sense it is incorrect to describe the first models of reality that emerge in the beginning of the heteronomous stage in terms of morality. They are really nothing more than models of a particular kind of constricted, narrow, hierarchical and arbitrary reality. A child's models of empirical reality develop initially through the pairing of symbols representing objects and the relationships between them with positive, primary, conditioned or generalized reinforcers. The language of these simplified models must be the language that accompanies values. Because the parent is an absolute ruler, controlling all values and all symbols, he is also an arbitrary socializer. At any given point in time, the child is positively oriented to the parent; after all, the parent has supplied the values required for existence for several years now. The child gets values by doing what he thinks the parent wants and expects. Consequently, the child's models of reality are always couched, at least initially, in the language of approval and disapproval. The highest number of positive values accompany behavior of which the parent approves and the most significant number of negative values occur in conjunction with behavior of which the parent disapproves. The child, confronted by this arbitrary power, learns quickly that the optimal value acquisition stratagem is to perform activities approved and avoid activities disapproved. The child discovers this can be done best in concrete situations by doing what the parent calls "good" and avoiding what is referred to as "bad." The premium is always on being a good boy or girl. Thus, whenever the parent allocates a value in conjunction with the emission of an operant or respondent, a sentiment expressing approval or disapproval invariably accompanies it, if not explicitly, then by previous training, implicitly. Even though the parent may not employ the terms "good" or "bad" directly, some equivalent symbols are substituted. The range of possible linguistic expression and behaviors which can be interpreted to mean approval or disapproval is enormous, precisely because these concepts are critical in the shaping of the personality. Leonard Krasner, for example, has summarized the findings of over thirty scholars in which the following stimuli have been selectively interpreted by respondents in interview situations as approval: "um-hum," "good," "good-one," "right," "that's accurate," "huh-uh," "give another one please," "I see," "uh-ha," nodding of the head, smiling, writing, leaning forward, paraphrasing, agreement, head shaking, repetition of the response, emission of light, the sound of a bell and a buzzer, and so on.[25] The only reasonable interpretation of the data possible is that the concepts of approval and disapproval are so central to all human learning and so common to the early socialization practices of the family that even seemingly neutral stimuli are selectively perceived as either acceptance or rejection. Approval, it will be recalled from the previous discussion of learning, is a generalized reinforcer.

A child's ideal self-percept develops largely around the reference points provided for authoritatively "good" behavior. Every child has a desire to be a "good" boy or girl permanently; what is begun in the family becomes a constant preoccupation of the child. As the idea of being good and the operational rules for proper behavior are integrated and internalized, the ideal self-percept takes its final form. Although the content of the ideal may undergo change with maturation, the change will normally be minor. Eventually, the ideal self-percept becomes the mainstay of the identity. Of all of the elements of the cognitive structure, the identity is least likely to change.

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[25] Leonard Krasner, "Studies of the Conditioning of Verbal Behavior," Psychological Bulletin, LV (1958), 364-366.

Thus, the child's initial models of reality are imbued with goodness, truth, justice and possibly beauty from the very beginning. It is small wonder that they should become so useful as a source of personal morality. The original models are given up because the child lacks the operational tool to test and change them and because they have been learned under conditions of reduced discrimination. The models have the capacity to resist the accumulated strain produced by errant behavior. As noted previously, the incapacity to test and change these models is a result of inherent limitations of preoperational intelligence. Their resistance to extinction is a function of the underdeveloped discriminatory powers of the child and the variable reinforcement schedules of the family environment. It may come as a surprise to some that the family would be classified as a variable reinforcement environment, especially in light of its authoritarian nature. The fact is that socialization in the family is seldom a deliberate, conscious and highly controlled activity. In the first place, families contain a number of socializing agents. The kinds of rewards and punishments allocated to various kinds of activity depend upon how the agents of socialization feel at the moment of emission. How the agents feel is partly dependent upon how other people in both proximal and distal settings have been responding to them in the immediate past. Not only do the agents of socialization see activity differently, and therefore, reward and punish activity differentially, but they seldom respond uniformly to the same activity over time. Any large variation will make reinforcement schedules random and variable, with the effect that the already limited discriminatory capacity of the child will be impaired even more. The family itself is vulnerable to major change: a parent may die or leave the scene, a new member of the family may be added, cataclysmic events may change the conceptual frameworks of the members of the family (daddy may lose his job to a machine at the age of forty and begin to despair rather than hope), and normal biological and social maturation may eventually alter the family's power structure. In summary, family reinforcement schedules are likely to be, especially in a pluralistic and mobile culture with many socialization agents (mommy, daddy, sister, brother, grandmother, grandfather, the lady next door, the baby sitter and the T.V.), extremely intermittent and variable. This, coupled with the limited discrimination of children between the ages of four to six, will lead to the internalization of models of reality that will be highly resistant to change. As the first models become more and more irrelevant to the demands of a widening reality, the child gives them up. At this point, the need for stability, the need for a system of morality, the need for relating the self meaningfully to the residual unknowns provide these original models with new tasks. The empirical models become primitive beliefs--a cognitive anchor in a world fraught with frustrations. New empirical models begin to develop, and as they do, they pull away from the older models, slowly broadening the distance and the interaction between the peripheral and the primitive systems. Each becomes highly specialized and irrelevant to the other. Finally, in full development, it is possible for a person to completely segment morality according to the natural specificity of the personality component involved. The organism can emit activities based on peripheral models which would be judged improper if referred to the primitive belief system for evaluation, and without the slightest awareness of conflict. Each system becomes functionally specific: more and more, the primitive belief system becomes the basis for meeting social demands for passing judgment on other people for purposes of social control; the peripheral system, in contrast, becomes more and more involved in the moral activity which stems from conformity to social norms.

To complete our discussion of the second stage, resolution of the third epigenetic conflict in favor of initiative can implant order, manipulation, cognizance or acquisition needs which may be satisfied by a more integrated use of existing skill traits formed by the earlier crises, or by new traits: Harria and Self-Sentiment Control). Alternatively, if resolution is in favor of guilt, the child may acquire aggression, conservance, withdrawal or contrariance needs which can be satiated by the organism becoming Presmiac. A second vital ego parameter, other-control emerges from the successful and preferred resolution of this crisis.

General Stage III

The beginning of the third developmental stage is somewhat ambiguous. The period of concretely operational intelligence begins around seven, but the autonomous morality period does not start until the age of eight. The major difference between the preoperational and concretely operational periods is the capacity of the child to employ primitive notions of logic, mathematics and statistics in the important task of expanding the scope and accuracy of the new models of the peripheral system. These operations are also performed on the primitive belief system to fill in the elementary skeleton provided by the earlier models. Articulation of the primitive beliefs normally takes the course of the most prominent source of morality available in the environment, probably religion, although not always. Full development of the operational tools during this period depends upon the full use of the sensory-motor capacities in operating on reality. As the child manipulates objects, turns them around and upside down, experiments with them in novel combinations, he begins to learn the potential of classification, the power of set theory to change and refine reality, and the value of induction, deduction and statistical inference in discovering new things about reality. This period is mostly devoted to learning the use of these tools, although the tools must be applied in a limited sense in order to discover their utility.

By age of eleven, when the period ends, the child is on the verge of full mastery of its immediate physical and social environment. The impetus for this mastery arises from the fourth epigenetic conflict between industry and inferiority. In Erikson's words, the "normally advanced child," in anticipation of the oncoming identity crisis when the personality will take its final shape,

> forgets, or rather sublimates, the necessity to "make" people by direct attack or to become papa and mama in a hurry: he now learns to win recognition by producing things. He has mastered the ambulatory field and the organ modes. He has experienced a sense of finality regarding the fact that there is no workable future within the womb of his family, and thus becomes ready to apply himself to given skills and tasks. . . . He develops a sense of industry--i.e. he adjusts himself to the inorganic laws of the tool world. He can become an eager and absorbed unit of a productive situation. To bring a productive situation to completion is an aim which gradually supersedes the whims and wishes of play. . . . Thus the fundamentals of technology are developed, and as the child becomes ready to handle the utensils, the tools, and the weapons used by the big people.[26]

It is during this crisis that the important ego needs are internalized. When resolution is in favor of industry, the socially preferred outcome, the child may acquire exposition, counteraction, competence, construction or achievement needs. The traits acquired to gratify these needs may include Zeppia, Comention, Praxernia, Shrewdness, Radicalism. Resolution in terms of inferiority can have disastrous results for the child in later life because it will impair his capacity to effectively engage in socially profitable activity. Inferiority will rob him of one of the most significant sources of values. According to Erikson, if the child

> despairs of his tools and skills or of his status among his tool partners, he may be discouraged from identifi-

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[26] Erikson, p. 259.

> cation with them and with a section of the tool world. . . . The child despairs of his equipment in the tool world and in anatomy, and considers himself doomed to mediocrity or inadequacy.[27]

It is in the successful and appropriate resolution of this crisis (industry) that that vital reservoir of minimal ego strength so important to the sense of competence that enables the child to take the risks of interaction with complete confidence is established. Because the self- and other-control parameters have already been established, this period is devoted to perfecting their use. Thus, much cognitive enlargement will involve rounding out an accurate view of self and comparing that view with the ideal self-percept established earlier. In effect, it is a period of intense reality testing and intraception. If resolution is in favor of inferiority, defendence, blamavoidance, recognition, status and exhibition needs may be internalized. To gratify such needs, the child may develop the following traits: Coasthenia, Abcultion, Autia, Naivete, and Conservatism. The exaggerated importance of this period stems from the performance requirements of society. Because every social system is organized around a division of labor based upon a dominance hierarchy, it is vitally important that the child have the motivation and skill to acquire status. In general, the higher the status, the greater the access to preferred values. In the interest of social efficiency the best technique for assigning status is on the basis of successful performance of important social tasks. Resolution of the fourth epigenetic crisis in terms of industry meets both the social and the personal status requirements of the individual by implanting positive performance needs which, if gratified, lead to high competence in the use of social technology. However, defendence, blamavoidance, recognition, exhibition and mere status needs provide an impetus for acquiring status through ritualistic performance without regard to the efficiency of social technology. Inferiority causes the substitution of hollow ritual for genuine and competent performance. For the child, it is an adequate enough way to attain status or gratify any of the other needs shaped during this period, but for society it is dysfunctional because it contributes nothing to social efficiency. At some point, it is likely to be negatively sanctioned by society.

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[27] *Ibid*., p. 260.

The period of autonomous morality, which appears to coincide roughly with the period of concretely operational stage of intelligence appears to be a dramatic and violent break with the fossilized morality of the heteronomous period. Piaget believes that during the autonomous stage, the child becomes more independent of the absolute morality of the previous stage and comes to understand, in a cognitive sense, the shortcomings and conventional nature of adult morality. The child begins to see morality as a sometime proposition, as something to be managed for convenience, an artifact to be manipulated, changed and conditionally obeyed. A good deal of research exists, summarized by Brown,[28] to prove beyond doubt that morality is not generalized, but is rather highly specific to the event and the situation. In effect, children do not seem to have a tightly knit moral system that guides all behavior classified as "moral." Instead, morality is multi-dimensional, having cognitive, behavioral and emotional elements. Brown believes that the specificity in the application of moral percepts results from an uneven development along these three dimensions.[29] Another way of explaining the same phenomenon, not necessarily contradictory, is to posit a segmentation of morality by personality component. Since each component becomes salient during different periods of development, it is reasonable to assume that the moral element of each is both specific and situational. The epistemological elements stem from the primitive beliefs and become particularly salient when social or personal demands are imposed for judgment or evaluation of the behavior of other people. The emotional element is specific to the ego, particularly the ideal self-percept. Failure to measure up to the ideal self produces emotive feelings of guilt, rage, shame, disgust, anguish and other states so often associated with the failure of idealism. The behavioral elements are specific to the general action system which operates to acquire values. Primitive beliefs, it will be recalled, were merely models of appropriate behavior specific to a particular kind of highly authoritarian, and relatively closed proximal setting. All organisms try to meet the requirements imposed by norms because social cohesion demands that normatively appropriate behavior be performed consistently as a condition to group membership. Group membership determines access to values. If a person can be Machiavellian enough to deliberately conform to normative standards, there is no reason to assume that he will not be intelligent enough to extol the virtues of normative performance, or morality, verbally. Intelligent adjustment to situational demands precurrent to value acquisition is often mistaken for overt morality. Finally, the juridical aspects of interaction and exchange appear to be the only truly generalized moral element, primarily because of the universal interest of man in distributive justice. Whatever component is involved in the failure of distributive justice should experience the typically angry response. For example, when a White Southerner complains about the immorality of the Civil Rights revolution in the South, his statement may conceal an ego fear that the principle of distributive justice will fail in favor of the Negro, and that he will lose personal and social status in the community correspondingly.

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[28] Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 407-411.

[29] Ibid., p. 411.

What Piaget classifies as a period of moral autonomy is really something more: namely a season of burgeoning segmentation of morality. The initial segmentation occurs when the two cognitive subsystems separate: the primitive beliefs become specific to the social demand to judge other people in the absence of consensual criteria and the peripheral models become specific to the normative morality of real situations. The ideal self-percept, we may hypothesize, is segmented to the ego during the industry/inferiority epigenetic crisis. During the heteronomous period, minor segmentation occurs, but of a fundamentally different sort. The child is disposed to accept parental rules on blind faith and internalize the standards of conduct imposed by the parent as models of reality designed to best maximize value acquisition in a totally authoritarian system. As pointed out previously, this involves nothing more than doing what the parent identifies as "good" and avoiding what he (or she, or both) classifies as "bad." But there is a very good possibility that the parents do not agree on their definitions of "good" and "bad" conduct, and therefore tend to relate in different ways to the same behavior. Where such conflict occurs, we would naturally expect the child to have two authoritarian models, one for getting along well with daddy and the other for getting along well with mommy. Thus, reality (mommy and daddy) is segmented into fields of management. During the autonomous period, this segmentation of reality into fields does not stop. Rather, it is complemented by a corresponding differentiation in morality. In the heteronomous period, the orientation to right conduct is absolute; variations occur in the focus of conduct. During the autonomous period, morality assumes two additional dimensions: knowledge and feeling. These are assigned to specific components of the personality and employed in varying ways to manage the moral demands placed on the organism by both himself and his society.

One of the persistent problems of socialization theory has been the gap between the simple, but popular Freudian account which holds that the child internalizes the "superego" of the parent, and therefore, adopts the parental-societal morality and the fact that the child's morality often exhibits gross deviations from that of the parent. There are a number of explanations available for elucidating this gulf: (a) the observer is seeing only the performance morality of the parent--if the real morality could be seen, it would bear a striking resemblance to that of the child, (b) both the child's and the parent's morality is on the performance level, and therefore, one can never really know whether or not they even possess "true" moralities, (c) the observer is seeing moral activity originating from two different dimensions which are not synchronized--if one could get the parent and the child on the same "wave length" (moral dimension), the resemblance would be obvious, (d) because every organism has a good deal of control over its own activity and the informational stimuli from the environment, and because the standards imposed by the parent are normally constructed around parental convenience, and in this sense, have nothing to do with adult morality, the moral systems of the child and the parent may be at "true" variance. While each of the explanations is inherently plausible, the latter is the most acceptable given the theory of value acquisition. In the first place, it puts a premium on the view that moral activity, thought and emotion are a small portion of the total range of activities and values which may interest a human being. Parents are also maximizers, and occasionally they have no interest in morality when they interact with their children. One very good way of maximizing one set of values is to have children behave in ways that are convenient to the parent. Second, it distributes the causal elements for the shaping of morality between the parent, other secondary agents, and the child. The child attempts to synthesize its own personality along lines which maximize the acquisition of particular values. The models and moral percepts may or may not be consistent with the moral interests of the parent. If the parent has a great interest in morality, chances are that he can shape the child's perceptual system to his own liking, provided he understands the socialization process well enough to do the right things at the right time. Because few parents maintain a consistent, over-riding interest in morality and because few parents really understand that they are shaping the child's personality when they allocate values, probabilities are high that the child's personality, and hence his morality, will differ from that of the parent. In most cases, the difference should be great. Third, even when socialization is supported by deliberate intent, unless the secondary agencies of socialization reinforce primary learning, the parent's effort may have gone for naught.[30] Finally, it rejects the proposition that men completely internalize the normative morality of the social system.[31] Each generation makes its own morality anew, constructed around the convenient normative patterns demanded by social efficiency.

General Stage IV

The period between the onset of puberty and the integration of the personality into what Erikson characterizes as an "ego identity" encompasses the fourth, and for our purposes the final stage of development. The personality does not cease to evolve, but later evolution will never be as dramatic, as difficult and as absolute as it has been in the past. By the end of adolescence, the individual should possess a fully developed, completely integrated personality system capable of meeting all the demands placed on the organism by self and society. The period of formally operational intelligence coincides with the beginning of the fourth stage (around eleven or twelve) and probably ends with the termination of formal education. Formally operational intelligence places in the child's hands the formal tools and procedures for testing reality at the most efficient level of performance. The younger adolescent is able to employ the elementary concepts of logic, mathematics and statistics in increasingly more sophisticated ways. His activity begins to resemble the highly formalized procedures of scientific method: propositions are educed from observation, logical possibilities are exhausted and evaluated, new combinations are tried, measurements are made and hypotheses tested, sometimes through carefully devised natural experiments. The goal of the period is the competent enlargement of the cognitive maps which guide behavior and a refinement of the tools designed to test them. The primary difference between the younger and the older adolescent is sophistication.

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[30] S. N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants (New York: Free Press, 1955), p. 99.

[31] Dennis Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," Personality and Social Systems, ed. Neil and William Smelser (New York: John Wiley and Son, 1963), pp. 68-79.

This stage is also the battleground of the fifth and decisive epigenetic conflict between identity and role diffusion. According to Erikson,

> The growing and developing youths, faced with this physiological revolution within them, and with tangible adult tasks ahead of them are now primarily concerned with what they appear to be in the eyes of others as compared with what they feel they are, and with the question of how to connect the roles and skills cultivated earlier with the occupational prototypes of the day. In their search for a new sense of continuity and sameness, adolescents have to refight many of the battles of earlier years, even though to do so they must artificially appoint perfectly well-meaning people to play the roles of adversaries; and they are ever ready to install lasting idols and ideals as guardians of a final identity.[32]

When resolution is in favor of identity, the gains of past conflicts and the diffuse components of personality are integrated into a tightly tied bundle capable of dealing with the new responsibilities about to be imposed by society. The "psychosocial moratorium" between puberty and young adulthood is a season of search, of experiment, of speculation, and of questioning. It is, so to speak, the safe harbor for a violent and troubled ship that would sink if allowed in open sea. In effect, the adolescent is removed from responsibility for his own behavior long enough to consolidate a personality with a final, stable, socially positive, and intrinsically reliable shape. If society does not provide his incubator, he makes it for himself through rebellious self-separation.

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[32] Erikson, p. 261.

The existence of a special period of integration does not imply that no integration has taken place previously, for at every epigenetic level, the ego has, in some way, integrated the accumulated gains of the past into an appropriate, functional whole. However, with each successive gain, the process of integration becomes more burdensome. The last stage is the most difficult, and for this reason, requires the longest and most secure period. The integration process itself, Erikson believes, involves the synthesis of "converging elements" and the abandonment of "divergent ones."[33] Among the factors mentioned by Erikson are "constitutional givens, idiosyncratic libidinal needs, favored capacities, significant identifications, effective defenses, successful sublimations and consistent roles."[34] In a sense more concretely oriented to the mechanical model of

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[33] Erik Erikson, "The Problem of Ego Identity," *Identity and Anxiety*, ed. Maurice Stein, Arthur Vidich and David White (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 49.

[34] *Ibid*.

personality, integration requires the horizontal division of the vertical components of personality, followed by the chaining of the products into horizontal channels of efficient activity. As difficult as it is to impose a physical concept on something as ethereal as the inner processes of the human mind, the process of component segmentation and channel-building can be diagrammed as follows:

Figure 3.8[a]



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[a] The similarity between this approach and Cattell's "dynamic lattice" must be noted. See Cattell, Chapters 12 and 13.

resolution of the identity/role diffusion in favor of diffusion create a number of pathologies related directly to the unpreferred resolution of previous epigenetic conflicts. These include

1) time diffusion (df "a sense of great urgency and yet also of a loss of consideration for time as a dimension of living") which arises from the temporal uncertainty of mistrust;[35]

2) identity consciousness (df "a painful over-all ashamedness somehow comparable to the original shame [and rage] over being visible all around to all-knowing adults--only that such potential shame now adheres to one's identity as a being with a public history, exposed to age-mates and leaders) which evolves from the resolution of the second epigenetic crisis in favor of shame and doubt;[36]

3) negative identity (df "snobbish hostility toward the roles offered as proper and desirable in one's family or immediate community") which is a way of managing the guilt created during the period when the third epigenetic crisis has been resolved in favor of guilt.

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[35] Ibid., p. 57.

[36] Ibid., p. 70.

[37] Ibid., p. 60.

4) work paralysis (df "acute upset in the sense of workmanship, and this either in the form of an inability to concentrate on required or suggested tasks, or in a self-destructive preoccupation with some one-sided activities, i.e., excessive reading")[38] which is "the logical sequence of a deep sense of inadequacy (regressed to a sense of basic mistrust) of one's general equipment."[39]

There are three additional epigenetic crises in Erikson's model: intimacy versus isolation (young adulthood), generativity versus self-absorption (adulthood), and integrity versus disgust and despair (mature age). These are largely conflicts which require adjustments demanded by the environment in the activity vectors of the integrated personality. Compared to the changes of previous periods, especially the adolescent moratorium, they are relatively minor, although they seem to be exceptionally significant in terms of maintaining the integrative gains of the past. The intimacy/isolation conflict is the result of the interaction of genital sexuality and the societal requirement for meaningful propagation of the species. According to Erikson, intimacy is "the capacity to commit himself to concrete affiliations and partnerships and to develop the ethical strength to abide by such commitments, even though they may call for significant sacrifices and compromises."[40] Resolution in favor of intimacy is obviously within the capacity of an integrated personality. However, the unintegrated personality, the confused, neurotic, inadequate, and psychotic human being, would find it difficult to sustain the energy and control required of intimacy. Generativity is also decidedly social, although as Erikson points out, "Mature man needs to be needed, and maturity needs guidance as well as encouragement from what has been produced and must be taken care of."[41] In a sense, the payoff is the ability to produce, create and generate. The capacity to socialize depends upon the quality of personality integration; only the most integrated have the patience for true teaching. Generativity reaches its perihelion in the strong, socially oriented ego. The final stage, ego integrity, represents the fruition of the previous seven stages. Again, Erikson puts the matter more succinctly and clearly than would be possible with a mere reconstruction of his language:

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[38] Ibid., p. 58.

[39] Ibid., p. 71.

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[40] Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 263.

[41] Ibid., pp. 266-267.

> It is a post-narcissistic love of the human ego--not of the self--as an experience which conveys some world order and spiritual sense, no matter how dearly paid for. It is the acceptance of one's one and only life cycle as something that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted of no substitutions: it thus means a new, a different love of one's parents. It is a comradeship with the ordering ways of distant times and different pursuits, as expressed in the simple products and sayings of such times and pursuits. Although aware of the relativity of all the various life styles which have given meaning to human striving, the possessor of integrity is ready to defend the dignity of his own life style against all physical and economic threats.[42]

Stated more simply, integrity is a stage of total accommodation with the internal and external tensions and frustrations of life. The inherent circularity in the relationship between man and society is betrayed here again: "healthy children will not fear life if their elders have integrity enough not to fear death."[43] In essence, ego integrity in the face of obliteration through death is a necessary condition for the satisfactory resolution of the earliest conflicts of infancy. Trust makes society possible by providing security for interaction; ego integrity in those about to leave society provides security for the growth of those about to enter it.

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[42] *Ibid.*, p. 268.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 269.

Psychodynamic Integration: A Theory of Fit

A single brutal truth emerges from the facts of personality development: socialization is an arbitrary, precarious and paradoxical process, so much so that there is almost no assurance that once the components of the personality have been acquired, they will mesh perfectly. An organism develops best in an environment where appropriate adjustments have been made to the readiness of the organism. A child may be ready for the next step in maturation, but there may be no support available in the environment at that critical moment to induce it to take the next step. Alternatively, an unready child may be forced by the environment to take a step for which it is totally unprepared. In either case, there is danger of retardation or permanent anxiety. Ideally, each of the components of the personality should develop at an equal pace. Failure of one component to develop at the proper pace may retard or pervert the development of the others. Because intelligence is the baseline requirement for all learning, any impairment of discriminatory capacities will most certainly retard general development. In most instances, socialization is not a highly coordinated process in which the primary and secondary agencies of socialization deliberately complement one